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Senate Proceeding on Dec 15th, 2010 :: 7:39:00 to 8:21:55
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Dianne Feinstein

7:38:57 to 7:39:17( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: up, all of us having the courage to do those things, make those cuts, do those things that are necessary to get our country back on the mr. president, i yield the f and i thank you for the time. mrs. feinstein: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from california. finesteinstein i ask unanimous

Dianne Feinstein

7:39:00 to 8:21:55( Edit History Discussion )
Speech By: Dianne Feinstein

Dianne Feinstein

7:39:18 to 7:39:39( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: consent -- mrs. feinstein: i ask that nancy be granted floor privileges throughout senate consideration of the new start treaty and the fy-2011 omnibus appropriations act. the presiding officer: without objection. mrs. feinstein: as chairman of the select committee on intelligence, i'd like to

Dianne Feinstein

7:39:40 to 7:40:01( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: address the strategic arms reduction treaty called new start that is now before the senate for ratification. this treaty has been carefully vetted. i'm confident that the senate will come to the conclusion that this treaty is in our national interest. and will cast the necessary votes for ratification.

Dianne Feinstein

7:40:02 to 7:40:23( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: i strongly support ratification. before speaking about intelligence issues related to this treaty, it's important to remind ourselves about the extraordinary, lethal nature of these nuclear weapons. i was 12 years old when atomic

Dianne Feinstein

7:40:30 to 7:40:51( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the bomb killed 70,000 people outright. you can see from this chart the absolute devastation this bomb caused. the nagg nag least 40,000 people immediately.

Dianne Feinstein

7:40:52 to 7:41:12( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: another 100,000 or so who survived the initial blasts died of injuries and radiation sickness. by the end 220,000 people had lost their lives because of these two bombs. and the horrible images of

Dianne Feinstein

7:41:13 to 7:41:34( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: disfigured bodies and devastating ruins have stayed with me all my life. i was part of the generation of youngsters being raised that hid in -- under our desks in drills about atomic bombs and atomic weapons being unleashed.

Dianne Feinstein

7:41:35 to 7:41:58( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: so bomb and here is nagasaki after the bomb -- after the bomb. it gives you a very good look at what it was like. now, today we live in a world with far more nuclear weapons. and even more powerful destructive capabilities.

Dianne Feinstein

7:41:59 to 7:42:19( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: in may of this year, the pentagon made a rare public announcement of the current united states nuclear stockpile, 5,113 nuclear warheads, including deployed and nondeployed and not including warheads awaiting dismantlement.

Dianne Feinstein

7:42:20 to 7:42:41( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: according to the federation of american scientists, russia's stockpile includes 4,650 deployed warheads -- deployed warheads, both strategic and tactical. the estimate of russia's arsenal

Dianne Feinstein

7:42:42 to 7:43:04( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: is 9,000 warheads plus thousands more waiting to be dismantled. many, and here's the key, many of these weapons are far in excess of 100kilotons or five times more than the bombs

Dianne Feinstein

7:43:05 to 7:43:27( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: dropped on hiroshima or nagasaki. many of these weapons are on high alert ready to be launched at a moment's notice and it would result in unimaginable devastation. so i ask my colleagues during this debate to reflect carefully on the extraordinary lethal nature of these weapons as we consider this treaty.

Dianne Feinstein

7:43:28 to 7:43:49( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: this treaty is actually a modest step forward, not a giant one. it calls for cutting deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 30%, below the levels established under the 2002 moscow treaty to 1,550 each.

Dianne Feinstein

7:43:50 to 7:44:12( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: it cuts launch vehicles such as missle silos and submarine tubes to 800 for each country. deployed launch vehicles are capped at 700, more than 50% below the original start treaty. according to the unanimous views of our nation's military and civilian defense officials, this

Dianne Feinstein

7:44:13 to 7:44:34( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: will not erode america's nuclear capability. our strategic deterrent or our national defense. the united states will still maintain a robust nuclear triad able to protect our country and our national security interests. as general james cartwright, the

Dianne Feinstein

7:44:35 to 7:44:57( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and former head of the united states strategic command stated and i quote -- "i think we have more than enough capability and capacity for any threat that we see today or that might emerge in the foreseeable future." end quote. additionally, these reductions

Dianne Feinstein

7:44:58 to 7:45:21( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: in this new start treaty won't have to be completed until the treaty's seventh year, so there's plenty of time for a prudent drawdown. but while its terms are modest, its impacts are broad. and i'd like now describe some of the benefits of ratification. i begin with the ways in which

Dianne Feinstein

7:45:22 to 7:45:42( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: this treaty enhances our nation's intelligence capabilities. this has been the lens through which the senate select committee on intelligence has viewed the treaty, and i believe the arguments are strongly positive and persuasive. there are three main points to make and i'll take them in turn. they are, one, the intelligence

Dianne Feinstein

7:45:43 to 7:46:04( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: community can carry out its responsibility to monitor russian activities under the treaty effectively. two, this treaty, when it enters into force, will benefit intelligence collection and analysis. , and, three, intelligence analysis indicates that failing

Dianne Feinstein

7:46:05 to 7:46:27( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: to ratify the new start treaty will create negative consequences for the united states. my comments today are, of course, unclassified but i would note that there is a national intelligence estimate on monitoring the new start treaty available to senators. i've written a classified letter to senator kerry and lugar that

Dianne Feinstein

7:46:28 to 7:46:48( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: spells out these arguments in greater detail. members are welcome to review both documents. following president reagan's advice to trust but verify, and in line with all major arms control treaties for decades, new start includes several

Dianne Feinstein

7:46:49 to 7:47:10( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: provisions that allow the united states to monitor how russia is reducing and deploying its strategic arsenal and vice versa. the united states intelligence community will use these treaty provisions and other independent tools, such as the use of national technical means, for example, our satellites, to

Dianne Feinstein

7:47:11 to 7:47:31( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: collect information on russian forces and wh russia is complying with the treaty's terms. these treaties include on-the-ground inspections of russian nuclear facilities and bases, 18 a year. regular exchanges on data on

Dianne Feinstein

7:47:32 to 7:47:53( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: warhead and missile production and locations. unique identifiers, a distinguished alphanumeric code for each missile and heavy bomber for tracking purposes. a ban on blocking national technical means from collecting information on strategic forces.

Dianne Feinstein

7:47:54 to 7:48:14( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: and other measures i will describe later in these remarks. without the strong monitoring and verification measures provided for in this treaty, we will no less -- we will know less about the number, size, location, and deployment status of russian nuclear warhead.

Dianne Feinstein

7:48:15 to 7:48:37( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: that's a fact. as general chilton, commander of the united states strategic command, recently said -- and i quote -- "without new start, we would rapidly lose insight into russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be

Dianne Feinstein

7:48:38 to 7:48:58( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: more complex and more costly. without such a regime, we would unfortunately be left to use worst-case analyses regarding our own force requirements." that's what a "no" vote on this treaty means. russian prime minister vladimir putin made the same point

Dianne Feinstein

7:48:59 to 7:49:20( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: earlier this month. he said that if the united states doesn't ratify th treaty, russia will have to respond, including augmentation of its stockpile. that's what voting "no" on this treaty means. so these monitoring provisions

Dianne Feinstein

7:49:21 to 7:49:41( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: are key, as is the trust and transparency they bring. and the only way to get to these provisions is through ratification. in fact, we haven't had any inspections or other monitoring tools for over a year, since the original start treaty expired. so we have less insight into any

Dianne Feinstein

7:49:42 to 7:50:02( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: new russian weapons and delivery systems that might be entering their force. the united states has essentially gone black on any monitoring, inspection, data exchanges, telemetry and notification allowed by the former start treaty.

Dianne Feinstein

7:50:03 to 7:50:23( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: last november, senator kyl and i traveled to geneva to meet with united states and russian negotiating teams. we met at some length with rose got miller, the assistant secretary of state for arms control verification and compliance, who led the united states negotiating team. we also met with the senior

Dianne Feinstein

7:50:24 to 7:50:47( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: members of her team, including her deputy, ambassador marcie reeves, m elliott, kurt e man, and mark trout. these effects and many of the other members of the united

Dianne Feinstein

7:50:48 to 7:51:08( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: states team were very impressive in their professionalism and experience. several had participated negotiation of the original start treaty or the intermediate-range nuke quer -- nuclear forces, the i.n.f. treaty. several were inspectors who are conducted on-the-ground

Dianne Feinstein

7:51:09 to 7:51:29( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: inspections in russia under start and i.n.f., or were weapons systems operators who had been responsible for hosting russian inspectors at united states bases. so this team was not composed of the uninitiated or of neophytes. they had both background and skill.

Dianne Feinstein

7:51:30 to 7:51:50( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: they were acutely aware of the lessons learned over the past decades of arms control and negotiated this treaty with an understanding of what monitoring and compliance verification mean. senator kyl and i also met two or three times during our trip to geneva with the russian

Dianne Feinstein

7:51:51 to 7:52:12( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: delegation led by russian ambassador antoli antonof, who's an experienced diplomat and negotiator. his delegation included representatives from the ministry of foreign affairs and defense, the general staff, and key agencies,

Dianne Feinstein

7:52:13 to 7:52:33( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: and roscosmos. like the united states delegations, the russian delegation had among its members inspectors and weapons systems operators, including those from the strategic rocket forces, the navy, and the air force. it treaty was still being negotiated at that time but the rough outlines were very much coming into focus.

Dianne Feinstein

7:52:34 to 7:52:55( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: i mentioned to the united states and russian delegations that it would be difficult to get 67 votes in the senate for a resolution saying the sky is blue. in order to get an arms treaty through the senate, it would have to have strong monitoring provisions.

Dianne Feinstein

7:52:56 to 7:53:17( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: in a lengthy conversation over lunch with russian ambassador antonof, i said that as chair of the senate intelligence committee, i would have to walk on to this very floor and assure my colleagues that the provisions in this treaty are sufficient for the united states intelligence community to

Dianne Feinstein

7:53:18 to 7:53:41( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: perform its monitoring role. i believe that ambassador antonof clearly understood that. and one year later, i am able to say on this floor that the intelligence committee has reviewed the question of monitoring the new start treaty at length. it is adequate. after the treaty was submitted

Dianne Feinstein

7:53:42 to 7:54:03( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: to the senate on may 13, 2010, seven months ago, the committee began its review of its provisions and annexes. we reviewed past intelligence analyses on monitoring previous treaties and the tools available to monitor russian behavior under this new start. the intelligence community

Dianne Feinstein

7:54:04 to 7:54:24( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: completed drafting its n.i.e. on its ability to monitor the treaty's limits in june, six months ago. we received a copy on june 30, allowing members to review it for six months before -- well, to review it before and after the 4th of july recess. the committee held a hearing on

Dianne Feinstein

7:54:25 to 7:54:45( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the n.i.e. with senior intelligence officials in july. not a single one of them questioned the validity or the judgments of the estimate. following the hearing, the committee submitted more than 70 questions for the record and received detailed responses from

Dianne Feinstein

7:54:46 to 7:55:06( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the intelligence community. those are obviously classified but they can be seen. in addition, the committee undertook its own independent review of the n.i.e. and the treaty's implications for the intelligence community -- committee, excuse me. committee staff participated in more than a dozen meetings and

Dianne Feinstein

7:55:07 to 7:55:29( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: briefings on a range of issues concerning the treaty. focusing on intelligence monitoring and collection aspects. based on the committee's review, after reading the n.i.e. and other assessments, and having spoken to directors of national intelligence, dennis blair, david gompert, and jim clapper, it is clear to me that the

Dianne Feinstein

7:55:30 to 7:55:50( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: intelligence community will be able to effectively monitor russian activities under this treaty. for the record, i'd like to describe the monitoring provisions in this treaty, many of which are similar to the original start treaty's provisions.

Dianne Feinstein

7:55:51 to 7:56:12( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: one, the treaty commits the united states and russia -- and i quote -- "not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other parties." that means not to interfere with our satellites. and not to use concealment measures that impede verification.

Dianne Feinstein

7:56:13 to 7:56:33( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: this means that russia, as i said, agrees not to block our satellite observations of their launchers or their testing. without this treaty, russia could take steps to deny or block our ability to collect information on their forces.

Dianne Feinstein

7:56:34 to 7:56:54( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: let me make clear, they could try and perhaps block our satellites. like start, new start requires russia to provide the united states with regular data notifications. this includes information on the production of any and all new

Dianne Feinstein

7:56:55 to 7:57:16( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: strategic missiles, the loading of warheads on to missiles, and the location to which strategic forces are deployed. under start, these notifications were vital to our understanding. in fact, the notification provisions under new start are

Dianne Feinstein

7:57:17 to 7:57:38( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: stronger than those in the old start, including a requirement that russia inform the united states when a missile or warhead moves into or out of deployment status. let me repeat that. there is an obligation that russia informs us when a missile

Dianne Feinstein

7:57:39 to 7:58:01( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: or a warhead moves into or out of deployed status. third, new start restores our ability to conduct on-the-ground inspections. there are none of them going on, none have been going on for about a year. new start allows for ten

Dianne Feinstein

7:58:02 to 7:58:25( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: so-called type i on-site inspections of russian icbm, slbm, and bomber bases a year. the protocols for these type i inspections were written by united states negotiators with years of inspection experience under the original start treaty.

Dianne Feinstein

7:58:32 to 7:58:52( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: and here's how they work. first, united states inspectors choose what base they wish to inspect. russia is restricted from moving missiles, launchers and bombers away from that base. second, when the inspectors arrive, they'll be given a full briefing from the russians to

Dianne Feinstein

7:58:53 to 7:59:15( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: include the numbers of deployed and nondeployed missile launchers or bombers at the base, the number of warheads loaded on each bomber -- this is important -- and the number of reentry vehicles on each icbm or slbm. third, the inspectors choose

Dianne Feinstein

7:59:16 to 7:59:36( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: what they want to suspect -- to inspect. at an icbm base, the inspectors choose a deployed icbm for inspection, one they want to inspect. at a submarine base, they choose an slbm. if there are any nondeployed launchers, ones not carrying

Dianne Feinstein

7:59:37 to 7:59:57( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: missiles, the inspectors can pick one of those for inspection as well -- as well. at air bases, the inspectors can choose up to three bombers for inspection. fourth, the actual inspection occurs with the united states personnel verifying the number

Dianne Feinstein

7:59:58 to 8:00:18( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: of warheads on the missiles or on the bombers chosen. as i mentioned earlier, each warhead is coded with a specific code so that you know which warhead, both numerically and alphabetically, which warhead you have chosen, and they cannot

Dianne Feinstein

8:00:19 to 8:00:39( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: be changed. under this framework, our inspectors are providing comprehensive information -- excuse me -- provided comprehensive information from the russian briefers, and they're able to choose themselves how they want to verify that this information is accurate.

Dianne Feinstein

8:00:40 to 8:01:02( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the treaty also provides for an additional eight inspections a year of nondeployed warheads and facilities where russia converts or eliminates nuclear arms. now, some people have commented that the number of inspections under new start -- that's the total of 18 i've just gone through -- is smaller than the

Dianne Feinstein

8:01:03 to 8:01:23( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: 28 under the previous start treaty. this is true, but it's also true that there are half as many russian facilities to inspect as there were in 1991 when start was signed. in addition, inspections under new start are designed to cover

Dianne Feinstein

8:01:24 to 8:01:46( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: more topics than inspections under the prior start agreement. in testimony from the director of the defense threat reduction agency, kenneth meyers, the agency conducted -- conducting these inspections, he said, and i quote -- "type one inspections will be more demanding on this

Dianne Feinstein

8:01:47 to 8:02:09( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: agency, his agency, and site personnel as it combines the main parts of what were formerly two separate inspections under start into a single, lengthier inspection." that's important. the inspections are going to be better. so while the absolute number of

Dianne Feinstein

8:02:10 to 8:02:31( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: inspections is down from 28 to 18, the ability to monitor and understand russian forces is not lessened. i'm really confident that we can achieve our monitoring objectives with 18 inspections a year. i also urge my colleagues to review the new start national intelligence estimate which

Dianne Feinstein

8:02:32 to 8:02:53( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: addresses these issues in detail. now, let me discuss a couple of monitoring provisions that were included in the expired start treaty but are not in the treaty we're now considering. first, under start, united states officials had a permanent

Dianne Feinstein

8:02:54 to 8:03:14( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: presence at the russian missile production facility at vutkinksk. you will hear about vutskinksk. inspectors watched as missiles left the plant and were shipped to various parts of the country. new start does not include this provision. in fact, the bush administration

Dianne Feinstein

8:03:15 to 8:03:35( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: had taken this provision off the table in its negotiations with the russians prior to leaving office. new start does, however, require russia to mark all missiles, as i have been saying, with unique identifiers so we can track their location and deployment

Dianne Feinstein

8:03:36 to 8:03:57( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: status over the lifetime of the treaty. so it's not necessary to have a vutskinksk. the treaty also requires russia to notify us at least 48 hours before any missile leaves a plant, so we will have still information about missile production without the permanent presence.

Dianne Feinstein

8:03:58 to 8:04:18( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: our inspectors and other nuclear experts have testified that these provisions are, in fact, sufficient. secondly, start required the united states and russia to exchange technical data from missile tests.

Dianne Feinstein

8:04:19 to 8:04:42( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: that's known as telemetry -- to each other but not to other countries. that telemetry allows each side to calculate things like how many warheads a missile could carry. this was important as the start treaty attributed warheads to missiles. if a russian missile could carry ten re-entry vehicles, the

Dianne Feinstein

8:04:43 to 8:05:03( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: treaty counted it as having ten warheads. information obtained through telemetry was, therefore, important to determine the capabilities of each delivery system. new start, however, does away with these attribution rules and counts the actual number of warheads deployed on a bomber or

Dianne Feinstein

8:05:04 to 8:05:26( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: a missile. no more guessing whether a russian missile is carrying one or eight warheads. with this change, we don't need precise calculations of the capabilities of russian missiles in order to tell whether russia's complying with the treaty's terms.

Dianne Feinstein

8:05:27 to 8:05:47( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: so telemetry is not necessary to monitor compliance with new start. nonetheless, as a gesture to transparency, the treaty allows for the exchange of telemetry between our two countries only, up to five times a year if both sides agree to do so.

Dianne Feinstein

8:05:48 to 8:06:08( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: and, in fact, it should be pointed out that if the treaty included a broader requirement to exchange telemetry, the united states might have to share information on interceptors for missile defense, which the department of defense has not agreed to do. third, there has been a concern

Dianne Feinstein

8:06:09 to 8:06:30( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: raised about russian breakout capability, a fear that russia may one day decide to secretly deploy more warheads than the treaty would allow or to secretly build a vast stockpile that it could quickly put into its deployed force. i don't really see this as a credible concern. according to public figures,

Dianne Feinstein

8:06:31 to 8:06:52( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: russian strategic forces are already under or close to the limits prescribed by new start, and they have been decreasing over the past decade. not just now but over the past decade. so the concern about a breakout is a concern that russia would suddenly decide it wants to

Dianne Feinstein

8:06:53 to 8:07:16( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: reverse what has been a ten-year trend and employ more weapons than it currently believes are needed for its security. it would also have to decide to do this secretly, with a significant risk of being caught. because of the monitoring provisions, the inspections, our national technical means and

Dianne Feinstein

8:07:17 to 8:07:38( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: other ways we have to track russian nuclear activities, moscow would have serious disincentives to do that. moreover, instead of developing a breakout capability, russia could decide instead to simply withdraw from the treaty, just like the united states did when

Dianne Feinstein

8:07:39 to 8:08:00( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: president bush withdrew from the antiballistic missile treaty. and finally, even in the event that russia did violate the treaty and pursue a breakout capability, i'm really confident that our nuclear capabilities are more than sufficient to continue to deter russia and to provide assurances to our allies.

Dianne Feinstein

8:08:01 to 8:08:22( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the bottom line is that the intelligence community can effectively monitor this treaty, and if you vote no on this treaty, there will be no monitoring. now, as i noted earlier, a second question relevant to new start is whether ratifying the

Dianne Feinstein

8:08:23 to 8:08:44( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: treaty actually enhances our intelligence collection and analyses. this is above and beyond the question of whether the intelligence community will be able to fulfill its responsibility to monitor russian compliance with the treaty's terms. while i'm unable to go into the specifics, the clear answer to this question is yes.

Dianne Feinstein

8:08:45 to 8:09:05( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the ability to conduct inspections, receive notifications, enter into continuing discussions with the russians over the lifetime of the treaty, will provide us with information and understanding of russian strategic forces that we simply won't have with a treaty. if you vote no, we won't have

Dianne Feinstein

8:09:06 to 8:09:27( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: it. the intelligence community will need to collect information about russian nuclear weapons and intentions with or without a new start treaty, just as it has since the beginning of the cold war, but absent inspectors' boots on the grouped, the intelligence -- on the ground, the intelligence community will

Dianne Feinstein

8:09:28 to 8:09:50( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: need to rely on other methods. a november 18 article in "the washington times" noted that, and i quote -- "in the absence of a u.s.-russian arms control treaty, the united states intelligence community is telling congress it will need to focus more spy satellites over

Dianne Feinstein

8:09:51 to 8:10:14( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: russia that could be used to peer on other sites, such as iraq and afghanistan, to support the military." end quote. put even more simply, the nation's top intelligence official, director of national intelligence james clapper, was recently asked about ratification of the new start treaty. he responded, and i quote --

Dianne Feinstein

8:10:15 to 8:10:35( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: "the earlier, the sooner the better. you know, my thing is from an intelligence perspective only, are we better off with it or without it? we are better off with it." end quote. so members should reali if they vote no to ratify this treaty and lose out on its monitoring provisions, that

Dianne Feinstein

8:10:36 to 8:10:57( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: means we're going to have to spend much more and it's going to be much more difficult to get information about russian forces. the final intelligence related question on the new start treaty is what impact, ratification or failure to ratify will have on our other foreign policy

Dianne Feinstein

8:10:58 to 8:11:18( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: objectives, and i think this is important. we live in a different world today where there are nonstate actors, where there are two nations, iran and north korea, moving to develop a nuclear weapon, and it's very important to be able to achieve a working

Dianne Feinstein

8:11:19 to 8:11:39( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: relationship with the large powers that give confidence to other nations to stand with us. this question can be addressed largely through open source intelligence. there have been numerous news reports and press conferences in the recent weeks about the broader effects of ratifying new start.

Dianne Feinstein

8:11:40 to 8:12:01( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: many supporters of the new start treaty have noted that ratification is a key achievement and symbol of the reset in russian relations that presidents obama and medvedev have sought. but beyond generalities of an improved relationship, a senate

Dianne Feinstein

8:12:02 to 8:12:23( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: rejection of new start would not only undermine our understanding of russia's strategic forces, it could disrail or disrupt a host of other united states policy objectives. in russia today, there is a heated debate over whether moscow is better served by

Dianne Feinstein

8:12:24 to 8:12:44( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: domestic reform and engagement with the west or by hard-line behavior that rejects cooperation with the west. russians view new start as a signature product of the reformers. this is the signature product of

Dianne Feinstein

8:12:45 to 8:13:06( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: russian reform and a new russian president. they view the fate of new start in this senate as a crucial test of the reformist claim that russia and america can work together. if we, the united states senate, reject this treaty, we confirm

Dianne Feinstein

8:13:07 to 8:13:28( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: what russian hard-liners have been saying all along: the united states is not a viable partner. here are a few real-world examples. russia has been allowing the united states and other members of the international security assistance force in afghanistan

Dianne Feinstein

8:13:29 to 8:13:50( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: to transport materials into afghanistan over russian territory. this has assisted our war efforts, especially in light of recent attacks against convoys crossing through pakistan. russia has withheld delivery of the s-300 advanced air defense

Dianne Feinstein

8:13:51 to 8:14:12( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: system to iran and supported united nations security council sanctions against tehran. tehran wanted to buy this sophisticated air defense missile defense system. russia was going to sell it to them. russia has withheld that sale.

Dianne Feinstein

8:14:13 to 8:14:33( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: that is a major achievement. also, russia and nato partners agreed at the recent summit in lisbon to a new missile defense system in europe. brand-new. this is an agreement for a missile defense system which russia has fought violently over

Dianne Feinstein

8:14:34 to 8:14:55( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the past decade. at that same summit the foreign ministers from denmark, lithuania, norway, latvia, bulgaria and hungary spoke out in support of the new start treaty. these are states to be defended, and they spoke out for this treaty.

Dianne Feinstein

8:14:56 to 8:15:17( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: as neighbors to russia and the former soviet union, they praised new start as necessary for the security of europe, but also as an entrance to engage in tactical nuclear weapon treaties which pose an even greater threat from state or nonstate use.

Dianne Feinstein

8:15:18 to 8:15:39( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: there is no quid pro quo here. russia has not agreed to support united states initiatives around the world if only the senate would ratify the new start treaty. but as every senator knows, when you're trying to get things done, relationships matter. and the relationship between the united states and russia has

Dianne Feinstein

8:15:40 to 8:16:01( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: been critical since we fought together in world war ii and will continue to be so. this is an unparalleled opportunity to enhance that relationship and to say by signature and by ratification of this treaty that, yes, the

Dianne Feinstein

8:16:02 to 8:16:23( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: united states of america wants to work with russia. yes, the united states and russia have mutual goals. and, yes, with respect to iran and other trouble spots, the united states and russia can in fact stand together. mr. president, let me move on to

Dianne Feinstein

8:16:24 to 8:16:44( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the nonproliferation reasons to ratify this treaty. new start demonstrates to the world that the two nations possessing more than 90% of the planet's nuclear weapons are capable of working together on arms reduction and nonproliferation, a "no" vote

Dianne Feinstein

8:16:45 to 8:17:06( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: says we're not capable of doing that. i believe that this will pave the way for more multilateral efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons as well as restrictions on tactical nuclear warheads that could fall into the hands of terrorist organizations. and let us not forget the

Dianne Feinstein

8:17:07 to 8:17:27( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: centerpiece of our nuclear nonproliferation regime, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. it's based on a clear bargain. those with nuclear weapons agree to eventually eliminate them and those without nuclear weapons agree to never acquire them. with the signing of the new start treaty, the presidents of

Dianne Feinstein

8:17:28 to 8:17:49( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the united states and russia are showing the other parties to the n.p.t. that we are living up to our end of the bargain and without new start, with a "no" vote on new start, we do not do this. this will strengthen the resolve of other nations to maintain

Dianne Feinstein

8:17:50 to 8:18:12( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: their commitments and uphold the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime to hold violators like iran and north korea accountable and subject to sanction. in fact, we're already seeing the benefits of commitments made in the new start agreement. the latest review conference of

Dianne Feinstein

8:18:13 to 8:18:33( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the n.p.t. in may of this year ended with 189 parties recommitting themselves to the treaties after the 2005 conference collapsed. on june 9 the united nations security council passed a fourth sanctions resolution on iran for

Dianne Feinstein

8:18:34 to 8:18:54( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: its violations of its commitment under the treaty with the support of china and russia. ratification also opens the door to further arms control agreements, both to further arms reductions and to address tactical nuclear warheads.

Dianne Feinstein

8:18:55 to 8:19:16( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the smaller-yield devices under five kilotons that are in some ways more dangerous than the strategic weapons with which we're dealing now. ratification moves us down the path to a world without nuclear weapons as envisioned by presidents obama and reagan. for years the idea of a nuclear-free world was ridiculed

Dianne Feinstein

8:19:17 to 8:19:37( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: as a fantasy. this may now be beginning to change. don't turn it down. republicans as well as democrats have come around to the idea that eventual nuclear disarmament is not only desirable, but it is in fact doable and it is consistent with

Dianne Feinstein

8:19:38 to 8:20:01( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: our national security interests. former secretaries of state george shultz and henry kissinger have joined forces with former senator sam nunn and former secretary of defense bill perry to make this case. in a january 4, 2007, op-ed in the "wall street journal," they called for united states leadership in building a --

Dianne Feinstein

8:20:02 to 8:20:25( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: quote -- "solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing the proliferation into potentially dangerous hands and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world." we can now do our part to build that consensus and help ensure

Dianne Feinstein

8:20:26 to 8:20:46( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: that we never again see the destruction caused by nuclear weapons. and once again i return you to these charts. i was 12 years old when i saw these pictures. i was 12 years old when i realized what a 21-kiloton and a 15-kiloton bomb can do.

Dianne Feinstein

8:20:47 to 8:21:09( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: ladies and gentlemen of the senate, these bombs are well in excess of 100 kilotons today. the number is classified, but trust me, they are well in excess. we can destroy the planet earth with these weapons. and they are deployed and they

Dianne Feinstein

8:21:10 to 8:21:30( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: are targeted, and they are on some time-release schedule. this treaty gives us the unique opportunity of working to reduce 90% of the nuclear weapons in the world. it is a big deal. and to say no to this treaty is

Dianne Feinstein

8:21:31 to 8:21:51( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: in fact to say we want to go back to the days of suspicion, of not working together, of the cold war ethos. we will succomb to the russian hard-liners. and we will take this first major test of russian reform and

Dianne Feinstein

8:21:52 to 8:21:55( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: effectively trash it. we must not do that.

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