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Senate Proceeding on Dec 17th, 2010 :: 4:39:50 to 5:09:35
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Dianne Feinstein

4:39:47 to 4:40:07( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: at the floor to her for that purpose if we may. mrs. feinstein: thank you very much. the presiding officer: the senator from california. mrs. feinstein: thank you very much, mr. president. excuse me. i see both the ranking member and the chairman of the committee on the floor, and i want to just say a word about both of them and the good name

Dianne Feinstein

4:39:50 to 5:09:35( Edit History Discussion )
Speech By: Dianne Feinstein

Dianne Feinstein

4:40:08 to 4:40:30( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: that they give to bipartisanship, and the fact that both of them see how much of america's destiny is really wrapped in this treatyy and how nuclear weapons really become a bane of existence because of the size, because of the number, and because this inexorable concern

Dianne Feinstein

4:40:31 to 4:40:53( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: that they fall into the wrong hands somehow, some way, someday. i'm one of the few members of the senate that was old enough to see the bombs go off in nagasaki and hiroshima. i know what it's like, and i know the devastation that a 15-

Dianne Feinstein

4:40:54 to 4:41:15( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: and 21 dill low -- 21 kiloton bomb can do. these bombs today are five times the size plus and they can eradicate huge areas. if you put multiwarheads on, the destruction is inestimatable. what's interesting to me about this debate is the fact that the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty was approved by a

Dianne Feinstein

4:41:16 to 4:41:37( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: vote of 93-5. the 1991 start agreement was approved by a vote of 93-6. and the 2002 moscow treaty was approved by a vote of 95-0. as the chairman of the committee, the distinguished senator from massachusetts, has pointed out time and time again on this floor with far less

Dianne Feinstein

4:41:38 to 4:41:58( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: deliberation that is being given to this treaty. i would make one other personal remark. the relationship with russia today is much better than was the relationship with any of these former treaties were ratified.

Dianne Feinstein

4:41:59 to 4:42:20( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: and secondly, the treaties were much stronger than this treaty is today. now for my remarks. i come here as chairman of the intelligence committee to address comments that have been made on the other side of the aisle about this treaty, particularly as those comments relate to monitoring provisions.

Dianne Feinstein

4:42:21 to 4:42:41( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: let me just put out the bona fides. the intelligence committee has studied the june 2010 national intelligence estimate on the intelligence community's ability to monitor this treaty. we had a hearing, we submitted more than 70 questions for the record.

Dianne Feinstein

4:42:42 to 4:43:02( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: we received detailed responses from the intelligence community. committee members and very highly technical, proficient committee staff participated in more than a dozen meetings and briefings on a range of issues concerning the treaty, focusing on the intelligence monitoring and collection aspects.

Dianne Feinstein

4:43:03 to 4:43:23( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the conclusion is on my part that the intelligence community can in fact effectively monitor russian activities under this treaty. i'd also note for all senators that i have just reviewed a new intelligence assessment from the c.i.a. dated yesterday.

Dianne Feinstein

4:43:24 to 4:43:44( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: it analyzes the effect of having new start's monitoring provisions in place and the loss on intelligence if the treaty is not ratified. i can't discuss the contents of the assessment on the floor, but the report is available to all senators. it is available through the intelligence committee and

Dianne Feinstein

4:43:45 to 4:44:05( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: members are welcome to review this report and other documents and the national intelligence estimate in our offices in room 211 in the hart building. let me now describe the ways in which this treaty enhances our nation's intelligence capabilities.

Dianne Feinstein

4:44:06 to 4:44:27( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: this has been the lens through which the senate select committee on intelligence has viewed the treaty. and i believe the arguments are strongly positive and persuasive. there are three main points to make, and i will take them in turn. first, the intelligence community can carry out its

Dianne Feinstein

4:44:28 to 4:44:48( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: responsibility to monitor russian activities under the treaty effectively. second, this treaty, when it enters into force, will benefit intelligence collection and analysis. and, third, intelligence analysis indicates that failing to ratify the new start treaty

Dianne Feinstein

4:44:49 to 4:45:09( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: will create negative consequences for the united states. so please read these reports. the u.s. intelligence community will use these treaty provisions and other independent tools which we have outside of the treaty, such as, the use of

Dianne Feinstein

4:45:10 to 4:45:31( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: national technical means, for example, our satellites, to collect information on russian forces and whether russia is complying with the treaty's terms. the treaty provisions include on the ground inspections of russian nuclear facilities and bases, 18 a year.

Dianne Feinstein

4:45:32 to 4:45:52( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: there's going to be an amendment, i gather, to increase that. i will get to that later in my remarks. second, regular exchanges on data on the warhead and missle production and locations. third, unique identifiers.

Dianne Feinstein

4:45:53 to 4:46:14( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: a distinct alpha new merrick code fo new -- neumeric code. a ban on blocking national technical means from collecting information on strategic forces and other measures that i'm going to go into.

Dianne Feinstein

4:46:15 to 4:46:35( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: without the strong monitoring and verification measures provided for in this treaty, we will know less, not more, less about the number, size, location and deployment status of russian nuclear warheads. that is a fact.

Dianne Feinstein

4:46:36 to 4:46:56( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: i think most of you know that general chilton, the commander of united states strategic command, who knows a great deal about all of this, has said that without new start, we lose rapidly -- we lose insight into russian nuclear strategic force

Dianne Feinstein

4:46:57 to 4:47:17( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: developments and activities and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex and more costly. without such a regime, we would unfortunately be left to use worst case analyses regarding our own force requirements. end quote.

Dianne Feinstein

4:47:18 to 4:47:41( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: think about that, members. let me be clear, that's what a "no" vote means on this treaty. russian prime minister putin made the same point earlier this month. he said that if the united states doesn't ratify the treaty, russia will have to

Dianne Feinstein

4:47:42 to 4:48:04( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: respond, including augmentation of its stockpile. that's what voting no on this treaty does. these monitoring provisions are key as are the trust and transparency they bring. and the only way to get to these provisions is through ratification. in fact, we have not had any

Dianne Feinstein

4:48:05 to 4:48:26( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: ins other monitoring tools for over 100 years since the original start treaty expired. so today we have less insight into any new russian weapons and delivery systems that might be entering their force. that, too, is a fact. 13 months ago american officials

Dianne Feinstein

4:48:27 to 4:48:47( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: wrapped up a two-day inspection of russian strategic missle base at takovo, 130 miles northeast of moscow where mobile ss-25, intercontinental ballistic missles were deployed. 12 days later the russian

Dianne Feinstein

4:48:48 to 4:49:13( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: counterparts wrapped up a two-day inspection at whitman air force base in missouri, home to a strategic bomb wing. since then, nothing. since those two inspections, one in russia and one in the united states, we have essentially gone black on any monitoring,

Dianne Feinstein

4:49:20 to 4:49:40( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: inspection, data exchange, telemtri. let me describe the monitoring provisions in this treaty now. many of them are similar to the original start treaty's provisions. number one, the treaty commits the united states and russia and i quote -- "not to interfere with national technical means of

Dianne Feinstein

4:49:41 to 4:50:03( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: verification of the other party." end quote. that means not to interfere with our satellites. and -- quote -- "not to use concealment measures that impede verification." this means that russia agrees not to block our satellite observations of their launchers or their testing.

Dianne Feinstein

4:50:04 to 4:50:24( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: without this treaty, russia could, and probably would, take steps to deny or block our ability to collect information on their forces. and there are ways this can be done. so let me make clear absent this

Dianne Feinstein

4:50:25 to 4:50:46( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: treaty russia could try and perhaps block our satellites. to be clear, national technical means are an important way of identifying some of russia's activities in developing and deploying its nuclear forces. however, i can't be specific here, there are some very

Dianne Feinstein

4:50:47 to 4:51:09( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: important questions that simply cannot be answered through national technical means alone. i have also reviewed those this morning, and those are available if a member wants to know exactly what i mean by this, and they will go to room 211, members of the intelligence

Dianne Feinstein

4:51:10 to 4:51:30( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: staff can inform them of exactly what this means. that is where other provisions of this treaty also, including inspections, data exchanges, un identifiers come into play. without them, we are limited in

Dianne Feinstein

4:51:31 to 4:51:51( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: our understanding. so, believe me, this is a big problem for our intelligence agencies. the second provision in new start on monitoring is a requirement that russia provide the united states with regular notifications. this includes information on the

Dianne Feinstein

4:51:52 to 4:52:12( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: production of any and all new strategic missles, the loading of warheads on to those missles and the location to which strategic forces are deployed. under start, similar notifications were vital to our understanding. in fact, the notification provisions under new start are

Dianne Feinstein

4:52:13 to 4:52:34( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: actually stronger than those in the old start agreement. including a requirement that russia inform the united states when a missle or warhead moves in or out of deployed status. third, new start restores our

Dianne Feinstein

4:52:35 to 4:52:55( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: ably to conduct on-the-ground inspections. there are none of them going on today and none have been going on for over a year. new start allows for 10 so-called type 1 inspections on site of russian icbm, slbm and

Dianne Feinstein

4:52:56 to 4:53:16( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: bomber bases a year. the protocol for these type 1 inspections were written by united states negotiators with years of inspection experience under the original start treaty. the day before yesterday i went over the credentials of our

Dianne Feinstein

4:53:17 to 4:53:39( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: negotiating team geneva, and many of them have done on-site inspections, so they know what they need to look for and they provided those -- those guarantees in this treaty. here's how some of it works. first, united states inspectors choose what base they wish to inspect. it's our choice. it's not the russian choice.

Dianne Feinstein

4:53:40 to 4:54:00( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: russia is restricted from moving missles, launchers, and bombers away from that base. so if you think about it, using national technical means, you can pick the base you want to go to. they are prohibited from moving, and you can go into that b

Dianne Feinstein

4:54:01 to 4:54:25( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: they are given a full briefing from the russians. that includes the number of deployed and nondeployed missle launchers, or bombers at the base, the number of warheads loaded on each bomber, and this is important, and the number of

Dianne Feinstein

4:54:26 to 4:54:47( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: reentry vehicles on each icbm or slbm. so you can pick your base, go to it, get the briefing -- these missles are all coded so you can do your inspection and you know what you're looking at. third, inspectors choose what they want to inspect.

Dianne Feinstein

4:54:48 to 4:55:08( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: at an icbm base, inspectors choose a deployed icbm for inspection, one that they want to inspect. at a submarine base, they choose a slbm. if they choose one that is not carrying launchers, the inspectors can pick one of those for inspection as well.

Dianne Feinstein

4:55:09 to 4:55:31( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: at air bases the inspectors can choose up to three bombers for inspection. fourth when the actual inspection occurs with united states personnel verifying the number of warheads on the missles or on the bombers chosen -- as i mentioned earlier each bomber -- excuse me -- each

Dianne Feinstein

4:55:32 to 4:55:53( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: missle and bomber is coded with a specific code numerically and alphabetically and the codes can't be changed. under this framework our inspectors are provided comprehensive information from the russian briefers. they're able to choose themselves how how they want -- choose themselves how they want

Dianne Feinstein

4:55:54 to 4:56:16( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: to verify this information is correct. and there are ways to do that verifying. there is also additional aid inspection -- eight inspections a year of nonemployed warheads where russia has nuclear arms. some have commented the number of inspections under new start,

Dianne Feinstein

4:56:17 to 4:56:37( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: that is a total of 18 that i just described, is smaller than the 28 under the previous start treaty. and this is true, but it's also true that there are half as many russian facilities to inspect than there were in 1991 when start was signed.

Dianne Feinstein

4:56:38 to 4:56:59( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: i just looked at a map this morning of these russian bases of the silo locations, of the bombers, of the sub pens, the numbers are dramatically smaller than at the end of the cold war when the first start treaty was signed.

Dianne Feinstein

4:57:00 to 4:57:22( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: so these inspections should suffice because the numbers are so down. in addition, inspections under new start are designed to cover more topics than inspections under the prior start agreement. in testimony from the director of the defense threat reduction

Dianne Feinstein

4:57:23 to 4:57:43( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: agency, called in washington-ease, dtra, kenneth meyers, the agency doing these inspections said a i quote -- "type 1 inspections will be more demanding on both the dtra and site personnel as it combines the main parts of what were

Dianne Feinstein

4:57:44 to 4:58:05( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: formerly two separate inspections under start into a single lengthier inspection." so whereas you go from 28 down to 18 and 10 type-1 inspections, you can take a much longer time. they are much more

Dianne Feinstein

4:58:06 to 4:58:28( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: comprehensive, and you have many more means to be able to get the answers to your questions. some of my colleagues who question this treaty have raised a couple of problems with the monitoring provisions. let me address a couple of them now. first, under start united states

Dianne Feinstein

4:58:29 to 4:58:50( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: officials had a permanent presence at the russian missle production facility. now, that's a facility called v votkinsk. inspectors could watch, they were afganistaned there, and they could -- they were stationed there.

Dianne Feinstein

4:58:51 to 4:59:12( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: new start does not include this provision. but the bush administration had taken the provision off the table in its negotiation with the russians prior to leaving office. new start does, however, require russia to mark all missles, as

Dianne Feinstein

4:59:13 to 4:59:35( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: i've been saying that's the numeric alphabet code with identifiers so it can be tracked over the lifetime of the treavment so it is not necessary to -- treaty. so it is not necessary to have a permanent monitoring facility at vut kink.

Dianne Feinstein

4:59:36 to 4:59:57( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: it is required that russia notify us before a missle leaves a plant. so we will still have information about missle deployment and production. our inspectors and other nuclear experts have testified that these provisions are, in fact, sufficient. now, look, i appreciate every

Dianne Feinstein

4:59:58 to 5:00:19( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: one of us and we do our due diligence, but let me tell you, there's nothing like the view of a former inspector. there's nothing like the view of people that have actually done this work. these were the people that were involved in the negotiation, and there's nothing like the recommendation of the entire top

Dianne Feinstein

5:00:20 to 5:00:40( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: command of our strategic forces, all of whom are for this treaty. now, we listened to military, it seems to me, on views that affect the security of this nation. we should with respect to this treaty.

Dianne Feinstein

5:00:41 to 5:01:01( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: i have not seen a single warrior come forward who is in the top command that said we should not endorse this treaty. i think that's significant. instead, dozens have come forward to point out how important this treaty is. start required the united states

Dianne Feinstein

5:01:02 to 5:01:22( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: and russia to exchange technical data from missile tests. that's known as telemetry. it required that -- release it to each other, but not to other countries. that telemetry allows each side to calculate things, such as how many warheads a missile could carry.

Dianne Feinstein

5:01:23 to 5:01:44( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: this was important, as the start treaty attributed warheads to missiles. if a russian missile could carry ten reentry vehicles, the treaty counted it as having ten warheads. in fact obtained through telemetry was, therefore, important to determine the capabilities of each delivery

Dianne Feinstein

5:01:45 to 5:02:05( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: system. new start, however, does away with these attribution rules and counts the actual number of warheads deployed on missiles. no more guessing whether a russian missile is carrying one or eight warheads.

Dianne Feinstein

5:02:06 to 5:02:27( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: with this change, we don't need precise calculations on the capability of russian missiles in order to tell whether russia is complying with the treaty's terms. so telemetry is not as necessary to monitor compliance with new start. nonetheless, because this came

Dianne Feinstein

5:02:28 to 5:02:49( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: up in the negotiations as a gesture to transparency, the treaty allows for the exchange of telemetry between our two countries only, up to five times a year, if both sides agree to do so. in fact, it should be pointed out that if the treaty included a broader requirement to

Dianne Feinstein

5:02:50 to 5:03:10( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: exchange telemetry, the united states might have to share information on interceptors for missile defense, which the department of defense will not do. third, there has been a concern raised about russian breakout capability, a fear that russia

Dianne Feinstein

5:03:11 to 5:03:31( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: may one day decide to secretly deploy more warheads than the treaty would allow. or to secretly build a vast stockpile that could be quickly put into its deployed force. i don't see this as a credible concern. here's why: according to public figures,

Dianne Feinstein

5:03:32 to 5:03:53( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: russian strategic forces are already under or close to the limits prescribed by new start. in other words, they have been decreasing over the past decade, not just now but for a long time. there are many reasons for this, but i think it's incontrovertible that that's fact.

Dianne Feinstein

5:03:54 to 5:04:14( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: so the concern about a breakout is a concern that russia would suddenly decide that it wants to reverse what has been a ten-year trend and deploy more weapons than it currently believes are necessary for its security. they would also have to decide to do this secrecy, with a significant risk of being

Dianne Feinstein

5:04:15 to 5:04:35( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: caught. because of the monitoring pro inspections, our national technical means, and other ways we have to track russian nuclear activities, i think moscow would have a serious disincentive to do that.

Dianne Feinstein

5:04:36 to 5:04:56( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: moreover, instead of developing a breakout capability, russia could decide instead to simply withdraw from the treaty, just as the united states did when president bush withdrew from the anti-ballistic missile treaty. finally, even in the event that russia did violate the treaty

Dianne Feinstein

5:04:57 to 5:05:18( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: and pursue a breakout capability, our nuclear capabilities are more than sufficient to continue to deter russia and to provide assurances to our allies. the bottom line is that the intelligence community can effectively monitor this treaty, and if you vote "no," you're voting "no" for no monitoring of

Dianne Feinstein

5:05:19 to 5:05:40( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the treaty. i'd like j for a moment -- and sigh the chairman on his feet -- to conclude, if that's agreeable. a second question relative to new start is whether ratifying the treaty actually enhances our intelligence collection and analysis.

Dianne Feinstein

5:05:41 to 5:06:02( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: this is above and beyond the question of whether the intelligence community will be able to fulfill its responsibility to monitor russian compliance with the treaty's terms. again, i'm unable to go into the specifics, but the clear answer to this question is "yes." the ability to conduct

Dianne Feinstein

5:06:03 to 5:06:23( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: inspections, receive notifications, enter into continuing discussions with the russians over the lifetime of the treaty will provide us with information and understanding of russian's strategic forces that we will not have without the treaty. and if you vote "no," we will not have it.

Dianne Feinstein

5:06:24 to 5:06:44( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the intelligence community will need to collect information about russian nuclear weapons and intentions, with or without new start, just as it has since the beginning of the cold war. but absent the inspectors' boots on the ground. that's what's pat risk here.

Dianne Feinstein

5:06:45 to 5:07:08( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the intelligence community will need to rely on other methods. put even more simply, the nation's top intelligence director -- official, director of national intelligence james clapper, has said that he thinks the earlier the sooner and the better this treaty is ratified,

Dianne Feinstein

5:07:09 to 5:07:32( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: we are much better off with it. you know, i don't think i need to tell this body what's at stake in terms of our relationship with russia. russia is -- the russian federation is no longer the soviet union, and this is really

Dianne Feinstein

5:07:33 to 5:07:53( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: the first reform vehicle of a new, young russian president that wants to enter into a much more transparent time with our country and has been of help to our country, specifically with iran, of letting our equipment

Dianne Feinstein

5:07:54 to 5:08:16( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: go through russian land into afghanistan, when pakistan refused to do so; in terms of refusing to sell a missile defense system to iran when it had decided to do so, and i think what this projects to the world as a whole is very

Dianne Feinstein

5:08:17 to 5:08:37( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: important in this world of asymmetric warfare. what it projects is that the united states and the russian federation is willing to stand together. and i think the gesture of that standing together that's envisioned in the enhanced cooperation of this treaty

Dianne Feinstein

5:08:38 to 5:09:00( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: should never be underestimated. members, i think we need all of the major powers to come together in this new world of asymmetric warfare in which we are engaged and most likely will be engaged for a long period of time. so, i very much hope that the

Dianne Feinstein

5:09:01 to 5:09:22( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: votes are th ratification. let me end with this: iring's during the 15-year life span of the first start agreement, the united states conducted 659 inspections of russian nuclear facilities. and russia conducted 481 inspections of our facilities.

Dianne Feinstein

5:09:23 to 5:09:36( Edit History Discussion )

Dianne Feinstein: again, it has been more than a year since american inspectors were at a russian nuclear facility. we have been in the dark for one year. it's time to bring the light of new start to bear.

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